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Abstract 
Technology is rapidly changing the speed and manner in which people interact with each other and with 
the world. As technology helps criminals to operate more easily and quickly across borders, so law 
enforcement capability must continuously improve to keep one step ahead. Computer forensics has 
become a specialized and accepted investigative technique with its own tools and legal precedents that 
validate the discipline. Specially designed forensic software is also widely used during the whole process 
of computer forensic investigation. This article introduces computer forensic and computer evidence, 
introduces and compares some forensic software, and summarizes its likely future development. 
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Forensi ComputingXiang Li and Jennifer Seberry AbstratTehnology is rapidly hanging the speed and manner in whih people interat with eah otherand with the world. As tehnology helps riminals to operate more easily and quikly aross bor-ders, so law enforement apability must ontinuously improve to keep one step ahead. Computerforensis has beome a speialized and aepted investigative tehnique with its own tools and legalpreedents that validate the disipline. Speially designed forensi software is also widely used duringthe whole proess of omputer forensi investigation. This artile introdues omputer forensi andomputer evidene, introdues and ompares some forensi software, and summarizes its likely futuredevelopment.1 Bakground1.1 Computer forensis denedComputer forensis or forensi omputing has beome a popular topi in omputer seurity irles andin the legal ommunity. So what is omputer forensis?Dorothy A. Lunn's (Dorothy) denition of omputer forensis is, \The employment of a set of pre-dened proedures to thoroughly examine a omputer system using software and tools to extrat andpreserve evidene of riminal ativity." Judd Robbins (Judd), a omputer forensis investigator, denesomputer forensis as \Simply the appliation of omputer investigation and analysis tehniques in theinterest of determining potential legal evidene." James Bork (James), in his artile \Leave the yber-sleuthing to the experts". Denes Computer forensis as \the equivalent of surveying a rime sene orperforming an autopsy on a vitim".From these desriptions, we an see omputer forensis an be dened as the appliation of omputerinvestigation and analysis tehniques in the interests of determining potential evidene. It deals with theappliation of law to a siene and it involves the use of sophistiated tehnology tools and proeduresthat must be followed to guarantee the auray of the preservation of evidene and the auray ofresults onerning omputer evidene proessing.1.2 Requirements for omputer forensisNowadays more and more riminals have been shifting their attention from armed robbery to omputerrime. Criminals may use omputers in one of two ways in support of their ations. Either as therepository for information relating to their riminal ativity, whih is alled omputer related rime, oras a tool in atually ommitting a rime, this is so alled omputer rime. For them, a omputer ismuh more powerful than a knife or a gun. More seriously, the probability of being aught on theirCentre for Computer Seurity Researh, SITACS, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, 2522, Australia.1
ations is very low. For example, a haker an break into a bank's online transation system and steal$250,000 without being aught or harged for lak of enough evidene even if he is aught. The fat isthat the riminals are no longer stupid and always easily aught as in the show on TV or in the movies.Many modern riminals are trying to use omputers and other modern tehnologies to realize their rimeswithout being disovered, this is so alled high teh rime. Therefore, the needs for professionals apableof performing eletroni investigations that an produe the neessary evidene to onvit have inreased.Another requirement for omputer forensis is beause of the vast number of douments now existin eletroni form. Years ago, most evidene olleted was on paper. Today, the majority of evideneresides on a omputer this makes it fragile by its very nature. No investigation involving the reviewof douments, either in a riminal or orporate setting, is omplete without inluding properly handledomputer evidene. Additionally, omputer forensis ensures the preservation and authentiation ofomputer data and greatly failitates the reovery and analysis of deleted les and many other forms ofompelling information normally invisible to the user.On the other hand, the basi nature of Internet tehnology oers riminals many ways to hide theirtraks and disguise their rimes. Computer rimes are borderless; the rime an be ommitted over amodem from next door or from ten thousand miles away, with equally eetive outomes. However, atthe same time, tehnology provides many lues as to the nature of the rime, how it was ommitted, andwho was behind it. In omputer forensis, things are not always as they seem. The riminals tend to staya few steps ahead of law enforement, and often ome up with the most inventive means of protetingthemselves and destroying evidene. It is the job of the omputer forensis expert to work with lawenforement to preserve evidene, reonstrut rimes, and ensure that the evidene olleted is usablein ourt. Only after extensive analysis is there any hope of nding out who is responsible for omputerrimes.1.3 Computer evidene1.3.1 IntrodutionObviously, evidene plays a signiantly important role in a riminal ase. The target of omputer forensiinvestigation is to nd potential omputer evidene that ould be used in ourt. \Computer evidene ouldbe dened as any item that supports the riminal enterprise urrently under investigation." (Anderson)It will inlude hardware, software, messages of transmissions, session logs, and password authorizationsor any other item that helps to dene or establish that riminal ondut has ourred The rst step toany omputer related investigation is to reognize and searh for the evidene spei to that oenebeing investigated. In many instanes the type of physial evidene will be easily reognizable. E-mailthreats, denial of servie attaks or password haking all leaves eletroni trails that must be preserved.Other kinds of omputer rime, suh as Internet hild pornography, haking, and virus attaks, may notbe as apparent and may require the forensi examination of hardware omponents as well.Gathering evidene in a omputing environment is not simple as opying les from the suspets'omputer and printing them out for presentation, although it is really an important part of the omputerforensi investigation. In fat, to aess and nd suh data we need speialized tools and knowledge. Thehallenging problem is to be aware of what kinds of information exist on a omputer and how to go aboutgathering and preserving the original data and making ertiated opies of that evidene. Deliberatelydisguised information in the form of enrypted, misnamed or steganographially-hidden data will alsobe explained. In ertain ases, we will be able to derypt data that has been found enrypted and themeans to do so will be explained and soures noted. But where an forensi investigators nd potentialomputer evidene? The following are some hints for them. List of URLs reently visited (obtained from the temporary Internet les or Web ahe and History2
folders) E-mail messages and list of e-mail addresses stored in the suspet's Address book; the lenamedepends on the e-mail program in use for example, the .pst le for Outlook (In some ases, thisinformation will be stored on an e-mail server, suh as an Exhange server) Word-proessing douments; the le extension is dependent on the program used to reate themommon extensions are .do, .wpd, .wps, .rtf, and .txt Spreadsheet douments; the le extension is dependent on the program used to reate them exam-ples inlude .xls. .wgl, and .wkl Graphis, in the ase of hild pornography ases; the le extensions inlude .jpg, .gif, .bmp,, .tif,and others Chat logs; the lename depends on the hat program The Windows Registry (where appliable) Event viewer logs Appliation logs Print spool lesOne the extration of the omputer evidene has been aomplished, proteting the integrity of om-puter evidene beomes of paramount onern for investigators, proseutors and those aused. Computerevidene is very fragile and an easily and unintentionally be altered or destroyed. Therefore, it is im-portant that only properly trained omputer evidene speialists proves omputer evidene.1.3.2 Rules of omputer evideneIn Australia the Commonwealth of Australia's Evidene At's requirements, a list of ve rules of evidenethat need to be followed in order for omputer evidene to be useful to the ourt, and make them easyto understand. Other jurisditions have similar laws. AdmissiblityThis is the most basi rule: the evidene must be able to be used in ourt or elsewhere. Failure toomply with this rule is equivalent to not olleting the evidene in the rst plae, exept the ost ishigher. AuthentiityIf an evidene an't be tied positively to the orresponding inident, it an't be used to prove anything.Forensi investigators must be able to show that the evidene relates to the inident in a relevant way. CompletenessIt's not enough to ollet evidene that just shows one perspetive of the inident. Forensi investi-gators must not only ollet evidene that an help prove the attaker's ations but also onsider andevaluate all evidene available and retain it. Similarly, it is vital to ollet evidene that eliminates al-ternative suspets. For instane, if you an show the attaker was logged in at the time of the inident,you also need to show who else was logged in and demonstrate why you think they didn't do it. ReliabilityThe proess of evidene olleting and analysis proedures must not ast doubt on the evidene'sauthentiity and veraity. 3
 BelievabilityThe evidene being presented should be lear, easy to understand and believable by a jury. There'sno point presenting a binary dump of proess memory if the jury has no idea what it all means. Similarly,if the evidene is presented with a formatted version that an be readily understood by a jury, you mustbe able to show the relationship to the original binary, otherwise there's no way for the jury to knowwhether you've faked it.1.3.3 Legal issues about omputer evideneThis is important for omputer forensis as often an inident ours whih involves more that one juris-dition, and ould also involve overseas jurisditions. Currently an Australian investigator has to havea working knowledge of all eight Australian Evidene Ats and the orresponding rime legislations. Aommon `loal' Evidene At would improve the funtionality of investigations where only one set ofdomesti `rules' is requiredInvestigators also need to beware that what is aeptable, legal pratie in one jurisdition may beunaeptable in another, rendering the evidene olleted inadmissible in that jurisdition's law ourts.An example where standard legislation would be beneial is where an inident ours in WesternAustralia in a national ompany whose head oÆe, and internal investigators reside in NSW. The in-vestigators, in addition to their loal NSW At also need to know the Western Australia At, and theorresponding rime legislations.Similarly an inident for an Australian based international ompany ould our in their Tokyo orLondon oÆe requiring an Australian investigator to attend the sene and ondut an investigation. Thisis where knowledge of international evidene handling rules is essential.1.4 The Computer forensi proessAs forensis is the reovery of evidene through a sienti method and methodology is the heart of anyforensi siene, omputer forensis is no exeption. A standard proedure for olleting, proteting, andexamining omputer evidene must be made and adhered to from start to nish, so as to preserve theintegrity of the evidene. A standard omputer forensi proess should inlude four steps:1. Identifying2. Preserving3. Analysing4. PresentingIdentifying is the proess of identifying suh things as what evidene is present, where and how it isstored, and whih operating system is being used. From this information the investigator an identifythe appropriate reovery methodologies, and the tools to be used.Preserving is the proess of preserving the integrity of the digital evidene, ensuring the hain of us-tody is not broken. The data needs to be preserved on stable media suh as CD-ROM, using reproduiblemethodologies. All steps taken to apture the data must be doumented. Any hanges to the evidenemust also be doumented, inluding what the hange was and the reason for the hange. You may needto prove the integrity of the data in a ourt of lawAnalysing is the proess of reviewing and examining the data. The advantage of opying this dataonto CD-ROMs is the fat that it an be viewed without risk of aidental hanges, therefore maintainingthe integrity whilst examining the evidene. 4
Presenting is the proess of presenting the evidene in a legally aeptable and understandable manner.If the matter is presented in ourt the jury, who may have little or no omputer experiene, must all beable to understand what is presented and how it relates to the original; otherwise all your eorts ouldbe futile.As the rst step of omputer forensi examination, Identifying plays an important role and it shouldbe followed as a standard proessing. The following is a general evidene proessing guidelines from NewTehnologies In. (NTICEPS):1. Shut down the omputer; this should be done as quikly as possibleonsideration should be givento possible destrutive proesses that may be operating in the bakground.2. Doument the hardware onguration of the omputer system being investigated and pay attentionto how the omputer is set up before it is dismantled it will need to be restored to its originalondition at a seure loation. A proper hain of ustody an be maintained and evidene proessingan begin. A hain of ustody is a roadmap that shows how evidene was olleted, analysed, andpreserved in order to be presented as evidene in ourt. Establishing a lear hain of ustody isruial beause eletroni evidene an be easily altered.3. Transport the omputer system to a seure loation and don't leave the omputer unattended unlessit is loked up in a seure loation.4. Make a bit stream opy of hard disks and oppy disks: The ompputer should not be operated andomputer evidene should not be proessed until bit stream bakups have been made of all harddisk drives and oppy disks. All evidene proessing, should be done on a restored opy of the bitstream bakup, not on the original omputer. During this step, speial designed forensi softwareis strongly reommended to use.Preservation of omputer evidene is vitally important beause omputer evidene is always fragileand an easily be altered or destroyed. Suh alteration or destrution of data is beyond reovery. Bitstream bakups are muh like an insurane poliy and they are essential for any serious omputerevidene proessing.5. Mathematially authentiate data on all storage devies: To be able to prove that the evideneshaven't been hanged, all les and disks must be authentiated. Suh proof will help you rebuthallenge that you hanged or altered the original evidene. Due to the improvement of today'sspeed of omputers and the vast amount of storage apaity on omputer hard disk drives, the levelof auray for A 32 bit CRC is no longer aurate enough. Therefore, urrently most forensiexamination tools using a 128 bit level of auray to mathematially authentiate data.6. Doument the system date and time: The dates and times assoiated with omputer les an beextremely important from an evidene standpoint. Doument the system data and time settings atthe time the omputer is taken into evidene.7. Make a list of key searh words: There are forensi tools available to searh for relevant evidene.Gathering information from individuals familiar with the ase to help ompile a list of relevant keywords is important these an be used to searh the disk drives.8. Evaluate the Windows swap le: The Windows swap le is a potentially valuable soure of evideneand leads. The evaluation of the swap le an be automated with forensi tools. Unix system useseither a swap le on one existing le system or an individual swap partition to store informationtemporarily. So the swap le or the swap partition must be heked for potential evidene.5
9. Evaluate le slak: File slak is a data storage area of whih most omputer users are unaware.The data dumped from memory ends up being stored at the end of alloated les, beyond the reahor view of the user. Forensi tools are required to view and evaluate le slak and it an provide awealth of information and investigative leads.10. Evaluate unalloated spae (erased les): The DOS and Windows 'delete' funtion does not om-pletely erase le names or le ontent. Unalloated spae may ontain erased les and le slakassoiated with the erased les. The DOS Undelete program an be used to restore the previouslyerased les. However, Unix system doesn't provide any tool to diretly reover the \deleted" les.The solution is to nd the raw data's loation and modify it.11. Searh les, le slak and unalloated spae for key words: The list of relevant key words identiedin the previous steps should be used to searh all relevant omputer hard disk drives and oppydiskettes.12. Doument le names, dates and times: From an evidene standpoint, le names, reation dates,last modied dates and times an be relevant. Therefore, it is important to atalog all alloatedand 'erased' les.13. Identify enrypted or ompressed les and graphi les that store data in binary format: As a result,data stored in these le formats annot be identied by a text searh program. Manual evaluationof these les is required and in the ase of enrypted les, muh work may be involved. Reviewingthe partitioning on seized hard disk drives is also important.14. Evaluate program funtionality: Depending on the appliation software involved, running programsto learn their purpose may be neessary.15. Doument the ndings: It is important to doument the nding as issues are identied and asevidene is found. It is also important to doument the software that was used in the forensievaluation of the evidene inluding the version numbers of the programs.16. Retain opies of software used: As part of the doumentation proess, it is reommended that aopy of the software used to inluded with the output of the forensi tool involved. Often it isneessary to dupliate forensi proessing results during or before trial. Dupliation of results anbe diÆult or impossible to ahieve if the software has been upgraded and the original version usedwas not retained.Following a standard evidene investigating proess will help investigators nd the right informationand keep the potential evidene reliable and believable by the ourt. However, during the investigat-ing proess, good knowledge of omputer systems and legal issues an't guarantee the suess of theinvestigation; speially designed forensi software is another esseential weapon for forensi examiners.2 Forensi software2.1 IntrodutionThe siene of forensis is a highly tehnial and detailed disipline. The methodology of a omputerforensis expert is that he has a wide range of omputer hardware and software expertise. He an identifythe intrusion by knowing where to look, what to look for, and what other evidene may be needed. Hwshould gather enough information to deide if law enforement should be involved. Most important, a6
omputer forensis expert has to possess a wide variety o skills, own or develop a suite of softwareforensis tools, and maintain the integrity of the hain o evidene aording to aepted legal praties.To ensure that omputer evidene is admissible in ourt, it is best pratie and use of forensi softwarewhih an help omputer forensi investigators. From the point of forensi investigation, forensi softwarean be used through out the whole proess from identifying to analysing evidene.Generally, there are some spei riteria for forensi investigators to hoose the right forensi software: It must not alter the data as a side eet of the olletion proess. It must ollet all of the data wanted, and only the data wanted. The user must be able to ensure whether the software works properly. It must be generally aepted by the omputer forensi investigative ommunity. The results produed must be repeatable.2.2 Classiation of forensi softwareDepending on their funtions and targets, forensi software an be divided into several groups.2.2.1 Hashing funtionsTo mathematially reate a unique signature for the ontent of a omputer hard disk drive is veryimportant to keep evidene reliable. Speial hashing algorithms must be used to reate the uniqueidentity for les and disks.Most law enforement omputer forensi speialists rely upon mathematial validation to verify thatthe restored mirror image of a omputer disk drive and relevant les exatly math the ontents of theoriginal omputer. Suh omparisons help resolve questions that might be raised during litigation aboutthe auray of the restored mirror image. They also at as a means of protetion for the omputerforensi speialists onerning allegations that les were altered or planted by law enforement oÆialsduring the proessing of the omputer evidene.In the past 32 bit algorithms were used for this purpose and programs suh as CRCHECK and CRC32beame popular. More reently it has beome neessary to use more aurate mathematial alulationsfor this purpose, i.e. 128 bit hashes. The reasons are tied to the potential for brute fore attaks usingtoday's powerful desktop omputers and also the volume of les that exist on ontemporary omputerhard disk drives. It is not unommon to nd over 100,000 les to be stored on omputer hard disk drivestoday and the storage apaity inreases eah in few months due to advanes in tehnology.The following is a omparison of methods to reate the unique identity for omputer les and data.CheksumsA method of heking for errors in digital data. Typially a 16- or 32-bit polynomial is applied to eahbyte of digital data that you are trying to protet. The result is a small integer value that is 16 or 32 bitsin length and represents the onatenation of the data. This integer value must be saved and seured.At any point in the future the same polynomial an be applied to the data and then ompared with theoriginal result. If the results math some level of integrity exists.Common types:CRC 16CRC 32Advantages:1. Easy to ompute 7
2. Fast Small data storage3. Useful for deteting random errorsDisadvantages:1. Low assurane against maliious attak2. Simple to reate new data with mathing heksum3. Must maintain seure storage of heksum valuesOne-way hash algorithmA method for proteting digital data against unauthorized hange. The method produes a xed lengthlarge integer value (ranging from 80 to 240 bits) representing the digital data. The method is said tohave one-wayness beause it has two unique harateristis. First given the hash value it is diÆult toonstrut new data resulting in the same hash. Seond given the original data it is diÆult to nd otherdata mathing the same hash value.Common types:SHA-1MD5MD4MD2Advantages:1. Easy to ompute2. Can detet both random errors and maliious alterationsDisadvantages:1. Must maintain seure storage of hash values2. Does not bind identity with the data3. Does not bind time with the dataDigital SignaturesA seure method of binding the identity of the signer with digital data integrity methods suh as one-wayhash values. These methods use a publi key ryptosystem where the signer uses a seret key to generatea digital signature. Anyone an then validate the signature generated by using the published publi keyertiate of the signer. The signature produes a large integer number (512- 4096 bits)Common types:RSADSAPGPAdvantages:1. Binds identity to the integrity operation2. Prevents unauthorized regeneration of signature unless private key is ompromisedDisadvantages:1. Slow2. Must protet the private key3. Does not bind time with the data4. If the keys are ompromised or ertiate expires digital signature an ause diÆullties
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3 Bit-stream funtionComputer evidene is, by its nature, fragile. Some data is volatile that is, it is transient in nature and,unlike data stored on disk, will be lost when the omputer is shut down. Data on a omputer disk anbe easily damaged, destroyed, or hanged either deliberately or aidentally. The rst step in handlingsuh digital evidene is to protet it from any sort of manipulation or aident. The best way to do thisis to immediately make a omplete bit stream image of the media on whih the evidene is stored. Abit stream image is a opy in whih every bit is opied setor by setor from the original disk to thedupliate. It signiantly diers to the disk bakup we normally used. Speial forensis software mustbe used to undertake bit stream imaging for forensi examination.National Institute of Standards and Tehnology (NIST) denes Disk imaging tool top-level require-ment as following: The tool shall make a bit-stream dupliate or an image of an original disk or partition. The tool shall not alter the original disk. The tool shall be able to verify the integrity of a disk image le. The tool shall log I/O errors. The tool's doumentation shall be orret.Basially, a bit-stream imaging tool should not alter the original disk, must log every issue during theimaging proess and notify the user if error happens. In addition, for seurity onsiderations, internalveriation should be made. It is used to verify the imaging proedures and to hek if there are anyhanges during imaging proess. Cheksums is one of the ways to hek the validity of the opy from theoriginal drive. It will apply an advaned mathematis algorithm to the information stored on a drive orle. The output of this mathematis will give a unique output. This means that we an ompare theoriginal with the opy using the heksum. The same heksums between original and opy shows anexat opy has been produed. It is almost impossible and extremely diÆult ot hange the informationon the drive without hanging the heksums. On the other hand, some of the disk-imaging tools useylial redundany heksums (CRC) or MD5 heksums to ensure the integrity of the evidene.3.0.2 Data proess funtionNormally omputer evidene an be easily found in spreadsheet, database or word proessing les. On theother hand, potential evidene an also be found in Windows swap le, page les, le slak or unalloatedle spae by using speial forensi tools.In suh irumstanes, data stored in non-traditional omputer storage areas and formats is alledambient data. Speial tools are needed to nd these ambient data for potential evidene.For example, many Windows appliations reate temporary les to failitate sorting funtions, thereation of indexes, and srolling. Suh les an ontain fragments of the work session that generatedthe reation and use of the temporary les. Most temporary les reated by Windows appliations, e.g.,databases and word proessing programs, are automatially deleted when the le and/or appliation islosed. As with other les erased under Windows, the data remains behind on the omputer storagedevie. Windows also reates temporary les as a normal proess during the operation of the omputer.Most temporary les reated by Windows are not deleted by the operating system.The Unix operating system is ompletely dierent from the Windows platform. Swap spae is aomplimentary omposition of Unix le system. You an use either a swap le on one existing lesystem or an individual swap partition to store information temporarily. Basially, there's no individual9
temporary les reated for appliations. So in most irumstane, the Unix swap partition is an extremelyimportant soure for seeking potential evidene.3.0.3 Windows system temporary lesOperating System: Windows 3xFilename: 386SPART.PARDefault Loation: WindowsSystem subdiretory or root diretory of the drive designated in the virtualmemory dialog boxOperating System: Windows 9xFilename: WIN386.SWPDefault Loation: Root diretory of the drive designated in the virtual memory dialog boxOperating System: Windows NT2000XPFilename: PAGEFILE.SYSDefault Loation: Root diretory of the drive on whih the system root diretory (WINNT by default)is installed3.1 Other data reover funtionsIn some irumstanes, omputer les are not really ompletely removed from omputer system. The\delete" identity appears to have been used but the data is still kept. These les or data an be reoveredby speial tools and identied as potential evidene.3.1.1 Content searhing funtionSometimes, we need a quikly searh on hard disks, zip disks or oppy disks for keywords or speipatterns of text. Dierent forensi ase has dierent keyword. For example, in a hild pornographyinvestigating sene, we an use \lolita" as keyword to searh potential evidene, however, it is absolutelynot the right keyword for a nanial fraud ase3.1.2 Password reovery funtionFiles or data in personal omputers sometimes may be enrypted for personal purposes. Sometimes,aess to these les and data is required for evidene olletion. Cryptography tehnology will be usedfor raking the password or derypt the enrypted omputer system. However, investigators shouldonsider personal privay issues before using this funtion.3.1.3 Audio and video enhanement funtionAudio or video data got from surveillane maybe hard to be examined dur to larity problems. Speialtools an be used to enhane the signals of audio or video data suh that investigators an obtain moreinformation from it. For example, speeh enhanement tehnology an be used for analysing forensireording on tapes.
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4 Forensi software produtsCurrently there are several professional forensi software produts on the market. Besides the mainhashing, bit-stream imaging, and test searhing funtions, they also provide some other features.4.1 Storage Media Arhival Reovery Toolkit (SMART)is a forensi software produt provided by ASR Data Aquisition Analysis, LLC. It is designed andoptimised to failitate data forensi pratitioners and Law Enforement personnel.SMART an aquire digital evidene from a wide variety of devies by reating a true and auratebit-image opy of the original, authentiate the data it aquires using any or all of the CRC32, MD5and SHA-1 hashing algorithms. It supports BeFS, VFAT, FAT32, HFS, HFS+,, NTFS, EXT2,EXT3,ReiserFS and many more les systems. SMART automatially logs an investigator's ations, providinga self-doumenting hain of ustody should it be required in ourt. Furthermore, SMART an generatea omprehensive report detaining the hardware, software, onguration and ontents of a devie or anentire system, quikly and easily.The ore requirement of professional forensi software is to seek potential evidene without hanginganything on the evidene storage media. To ensure the reliability of the evidene by the law enforement,SMART reates a true image of the seized evidene disk bit by bit and authentiates the oherene ofthe image le against the original media by heking the hashing value to prove the evidene was foundin a unmodied environment.Currently SMART only support BeOS and Linux operating system. The support to other platformssuh as Windows or Ma OS will be available next.4.1.1 Core features of SMART Data Aquisition (disk imaging, wiping and restoring) Data Authentiation (hashing) Data Analysis (media Searhing) Log and Report4.2 EnCase4.2.1 Core features of EnCase Multiple Sorting Fields, Inluding Time Stamps Automated Searh and Analysis of Zip Files and E-Mail Attahments File Signature and Hash Library Support Esript Maro Language Uniode Support4.3 Mareswareis Mares and Company's forensis software produt. \It provides an essential set of tools for investigatingomputer reords and seuring private information."11
4.4 Law Enforement Software (LESS)is the NTI's (New Tehnologies In.) forensi software produt. It inludes several forensi tools runningunder Windows or DOS platform, whih have speial forensi funtionalities.5 Forensi speial purpose software5.1 Forensi software for steganographySteganography is the art of hiding information within information so as to not arouse suspiion andthe proess of injeting information into overt hannels so ass to oneal the information. It is aneetive tool for proteting personal information, and organizations are spending a lot of energy andtime ain analysing steganography tehniques to protet their integrity. However, steganography an alsobe detrimental. It is hindering law enforement authorities in gathering evidene to stop illegal ativities,beause these tehniques of hiding information are beoming more sophistiated.Steganography hides the existene of a message by transmitting information through various arriers.Its goal is to prevent the detetion of a seret message. The most ommon use of steganography ishiding information from one le within the information of another le. For example, over arriers, suhas images, audio, video, text, or ode represented digitally, hold the hidden information. The hiddeninformation may be plaintext, ipher text, images, or information hidden in a bit stream.As riminals beome more aware of the apabilities of forensi examiners to reover omputer evidenethey are making more use of enryption tehnology suh as to oneal inriminating data. Online hildpornographers use steganography tehnology to reate private ommuniations and hide the les theyexhanged into normal omputer les.On the ontrary, the polie an use the steganography tehnologies to obtain more evidene. Forexample, one appliation o steganography is data struture enhanement. The polie ould use thistehnology to enhane the surveillant video pitures in order to nd more details about the rime seneand suspets. They also an use attak methods on steganography to nd the hidden rime evidene.The normal solution to detet hidden information is to build a library of hash sets and omparethem with hash values of les being investigated. The hash sets will identify steganography le mathes.Investigators must use safe hash sets to lter harmless les from their investigation. System les thathave not been modied sine installation are inluded in a safe hash set. National Institute of Standardsand Tehnology (NIST)'s Information Tehnology Laboratory one ongoing omputer forensis researhprojet alled National Software Referene Library (NSRL), whih try to ompute a unique identierfor eah le in the normal operating systems based on the le's ontents. These identiers are reatedby SHA-1 hash algorithm. So if a perpetrator tries to hide a pornographi image by renaming it as anondesript operating system le, .EXE, renaming a .JPG image as an .EXE le, The hash value derivedfrom the image will not math that from the known operating system le and will thus be unovered.5.1.1 Forensi software for PDAsCurrently, most omputer forensi software produts are designed for desktop or laptop. However, Per-sonal Digital Assistant (PDA) is now being widely used for business ommuniation and personal mobileomputing, whih may also be involved in many riminal senes. Thus, speial forensi software designedto examine and identify omputer evidene on PDA is needed.Joseph Grand (Joseph), in his artile \pdd: Memory Imaging and Forensi Analysis of Palm OSDevies" introdues a Windows-based tool for memory imaging and forensi aquisition of data from the12
Palm operating system (OS) family o .pdd an preserve the rime sene by obtaining a bit-for-bit imageor "snapshot" of the Palm devie's memory ontents.The data retrieved by pdd inludes all user appliations and databases (along with stray databasesthat old appliations left behind). This provides a signiant amount of information for forensi analysis.For example, reords that have been marked for deletion by appliations using the Palm APID-mDeleteReord funtion (e.g., from the Address Book, Memo Pad, To Do Lisst, Callendar, et.( arenot atually removed and will remain on the devie until a suessful HotSyn operation to a desktopmahine. So the data an still be reovered before the HotSyn has taken plae but after reords havebeen `deleted'.6 Conlusion and Future DiretionsComputer forensis is used to identify evidene when personal omputers are used in the ommission ofrimes or in the abuse of ompany poliies. Evidene is the foundation of every riminal ase, inludingthose involving omputer rimes. The olletion and preservation of omputer evidene diers in manyways from the methods law enforement oÆers are used to using for traditional types of evidene.The tehnology in omputer forensi led is hanging at an unpreedented rate and we an onlyantiipate that the task of the omputer forensi experts is going to beome ever more hallenging. Agood grasp of the theoretial and pratial priniples of omputer and legal knowledge is an essentialprerequisite for the professional forensi analyst.Computer forensi speialists guarantee auray of evidene proessing results through the use oftime-tested evidene proessing proedures and through the use of multiple forensi software. The use ofdierent forensi software tools that have been developed independently to validate results is importantto avoid inauraies introdued by potential software design aws and software bugs.Historially omputer forensis was foused on the imaging, analysis, and reporting of a stand- alonepersonal omputer hard drive perhaps 1 GB in size using DOS-based tools. However, due to a numberof hanges and advanes in tehnology an evolution has begun in the eld of omputer forensis.The rst type of hange onsists of larger hard drives. It is now ommon for hard drives on personalomputers to be 40-60GB in size. And, in the orporate environment, it is not unommon to haveenterprise-lass servers ontaining multiple 80GB hard drives in eah. There has also been a signiantinrease in the number o PCs, and a noteworthy rise in the use of PCs to ommit rimes or aid in riminalativities. The seond type of hange inludes the popularity of non-PC devies suh as handhelds, mobileellular telephones, digital ameras, servers, et. The third type of hange is the inrease in the numberof non-Windows operating systems, inluding both UNIX and Linus variants, MaOS, BeOS, et.Inreasingly, forensi examiners are faed with analyzing `non-traditional' PCs, orporate seurityprofessionals are doubling as in-house forensi examiners and inident rst responders, and ritial datais residing in volatile system memory.Thomas Rude (Thomas), in his artile \Next Generation Data Forensis and Linux" denes `NextGeneration Data Forensis' as \The proess of imaging and analysing data stored in any eletroni format,for the purpose of reporting ndings in a neutral manner, with no predisposition ass to guilt or innoene."So, what's next? New automated software into the omputer forensis investigative proess will beintrodued, stable foundation built on sienti rigor to support the introdution of evidene and experttestimony in ourt will be provided. In general, the new generation omputer forensi software willsupport signiantly larger hard drivers, non-PC devies suh as servers, handhelds, digital ameras, et.and more non-Windows operating systems suh as MaOS, AIX, and Solaris et\Improve law enforement apaity to fully engage with the sienti ommunity. Appoint a high levelSiene and Tehnology poliy group, underpinned by a siene and tehnology learing house. Identify13
mehanisms to enourage Australian industry and researh agenies to partiipate in the developmentand prodution of new, aordable tehnologies for law enforement".These are three reommendations from Prime Minister's Siene, Engineering and Innovation Counil(PMSEIC) for stakeholders of rime prevention and law enforement. Look ahead, omputer forensisientists and forensi software developers still have a long way to go.Referen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